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The problem
In recent decades, many countries have increased the tax support they provide for research and development
(R&D). The traditional model of funding has been to have government bureaucrats sifting through project proposals
and then deciding which are the most deserving. An alternative is to let firms decide where to put their research
money and simply treat R&D more generously through the tax code. This saves administrative costs, but may be
inefficient if the government is good at spotting which projects will generate big knowledge ‘spillovers’. But
governments may not be great at this and may be tempted to spend more on vanity projects for the politically
connected.
In April 2000, the UK joined the growing list of countries offering a more generous tax deal for R&D. It did so
because the UK has a productivity problem. GDP per hour is 30 percent below that in France, Germany and the
United States. Since productivity growth is the main determinant of income growth, this is a major problem for the
UK economy.
The UK also has an innovation gap mirroring the productivity gap. Business R&D is also below that of its peers (see
Figure 1). Furthermore, whereas most countries have been increasing the share of GDP devoted to R&D, UK R&D
began a sharp downhill slide from the early 1980s. The downward path is due to many things including a rapid
decline of R&D intensive manufacturing. But interestingly, the downward trend levelled off in the 2000s, at the same
time as the tax credit system became more generous.
Figure 1: Business Enterprise Research and Development as a fraction of GDP
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Note: The data is from OECD MSTI downloaded February 9th 2016. The dotted line is the
counterfactual R&D intensity in the UK that we estimate in the absence of the R&D Tax Relief
Scheme
The policy experiment
Could the improvement in R&D and the tax changes just be a coincidence?
It’s hard to know from the macro data, but there was a neat policy experiment in 2008 that helps to tease this out.
The UK, like most other countries offers more generous subsidies to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)
than larger firms. But what is an SME? When the tax credit was introduced, the UK just used the standard EU-wide
definition. But in 2008, the government decided to raise the thresholds for what counted as an SME only for the R&D
tax credit system.
Firms with assets below above €43 million but below €86 million weren’t counted as SMEs before 2008; then after
2008 they were counted as SMEs! This reduced the cost of their R&D by over 30 percent – and our research finds
that this led to big increases in their R&D and, more importantly, their level of innovation as measured by patenting.
The best way to see this is to look at what happens around the new tax threshold using a ‘regression discontinuity
design’. We were granted confidential access to the universe of firms’ tax records and accounts through the HMRC
Datalab (over two million companies).
When looking at firm’s 2009 levels of R&D as a function of their pre-policy pre-2007 level of assets, Figure 2 shows
that a firm just below the new SME threshold had an unexpectedly large jump in their R&D. Figure 3 shows that
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exactly the same thing happened for patents. Since there are no other policies that kick in that threshold, it seems
likely that the big jumps in R&D and patents were due to the new policy. The magnitudes are large: there was
roughly a doubling of R&D and a 60 percent increase in innovation as a result of the policy.
Figure 2. Discontinuity in average R&D expenditure over 2009-11
Note: The figure corresponds to the baseline R&D expenditure regression using a
Regression Discontinuity (RD) Design. The dependent variable is average R&D expenditure
over 2009-11. The running variable is total assets in 2007 with a threshold of €86m. The
baseline sample includes firms with total assets in 2007 €25m above and €25m below the cut-
off (i.e. between €61m and €111m). Controls for the running variable are estimated separately
on each side of the threshold. The OLS discontinuity estimate at the €86m threshold is
138,540 with a standard error of 55,318. Bin size for the scatter plot is €3m.
Figure 3. Discontinuity in average number of patents over 2009-11
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Note: The figure corresponds to our baseline reduced-form patent regression using an RD
Design. The dependent variable is average number of patents over 2009-11. The running
variable is total assets in 2007 with a threshold of €86m. Baseline sample includes firms with
total assets in 2007 €25m above and below the cut-off (i.e. between €61m and €111m).
Controls for running variable separately for each side of the threshold are included. The OLS
discontinuity estimate at the €86m threshold is 0.073 with a standard error of 0.026. Bin size
for the scatter plot is €3m.
Seeing an impact on innovation is particularly important as a worry about R&D tax credits is that firms don’t do more
R&D but instead relabel activities that weren’t previously classified as R&D (such as marketing expenses and
managers) to take advantage of the largesse of the tax collection agency. But there is no incentive to do this for
patents.
We also show that the quality of patents did not deteriorate. Firms increased the rates at which they applied for (high
value) EU-wide patents as well as (lower value) UK only patents, for example. The citation rate per patent, another
indicator of value, also did not decline for firms that benefited from the policy.
Similarly, we find that firms that received a bigger incentive to do R&D increased in size whether measured by sales
revenues or by the number of jobs
Why such a big effect?
We calculate what was the effective reduction in the ‘price’ of R&D from the changing policy and compared this with
the R&D response. This generates a tax-price elasticity of about 2.6, in other words a 10 percent fall in the price
generates about a 26 percent increase in the volume of R&D. This is a bigger response than other studies find (see
Becker, 2015; Hall and Van Reenen, 2000).
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The reason for the greater policy effectiveness is simple. Most other studies have implicitly or explicitly focused on
large firms, whereas the policy we look at targets SMEs. The gap in the literature is because rich data on SMEs
have only recently become available – SMEs are typically under no obligation to report their R&D spending publicly,
so it is only when we are able to use administrative micro-data that such studies can be done. And although
industry-level and macro-data implicitly includes smaller firms via confidential government surveys, the aggregate
numbers are dominated by larger firms (for example, Bloom et al, 2002).
Smaller firms are more likely to face cash constraints in raising finance for innovation and hence underspend. In
fact, this is the very reason why governments typically give them more generous subsidies to perform R&D than
larger firms.
In our data, we find that it was younger firms that were most responsive, which makes sense in terms of their
greater liquidity constraints. The market knows least about young firms and therefore will be unlikely to lend
adequate amounts as innovation has little collateral and is subject, by its nature, to an acute lack of information.
Policy bottom lines
We evaluate the aggregate effects of the UK’s R&D tax policy since 2000 using our tax-price elasticity estimates for
SMEs, other estimates in the literature for large firms, and the evolution of the tax system through 2013.
We find that the policy regime had a substantial impact on R&D. Figure 1 compares what actually happened to
business R&D with what we would have expected to happen in the absence of R&D tax breaks. It is clear that the
long-term decline of UK R&D intensity would have continued unabated. Furthermore, we calculate that business
R&D would be 10% lower if the tax breaks were abolished.
Over the 2006-2011 period of our study, taxpayers gave up about £1 billion per year to induce firms to generate an
additional £1.7 billion of R&D. A 1.7 to 1 ratio is a pretty good return for any policy, let alone for R&D.
Of course, this is not the end of the story. What matters is what the R&D does. We find that the R&D increased
innovation and growth for the firms that received the tax relief. But we also find that there are technology spillovers
even for firms that did not receive tax incentives. Firms that were operating in similar technology areas to the firms
that were ‘exogenously shocked’ into doing more R&D as a result of the policy also increased their innovation rates.
These technology spillovers magnify the impact of the policy. Indeed, they are the reason why too little money is
likely to be spent on R&D in the first place, as firms only receive a fraction of the returns for their R&D efforts.
The bottom line is that the return to £1 of taxpayer’s money in GDP terms is much higher than £1.70. The policy
easily passes a cost-benefit test.
Parties of all political stripes have, so far, supported and extended the R&D tax relief system. It is an unusual
example in the UK of political consensus around a growth policy. But as austerity continues, there is ever-mounting
pressure to cut back on a system that today costs around £1.4 billion a year. Our study suggests that this is an
innovation policy that works and which, in the long run, fosters productivity growth. At a time when underlying growth
is so desperately needed, the policy should be preserved, not undermined.
♣♣♣
Notes:
This post is based on the paper Do Fiscal Incentives increase innovation? An RDD for R&D , by Antoine
Dechezlepretre, Elias Einio, Ralf Martin, Kieu-Trang Nguyen and John Van Reenen (2016), LSE’s Centre for
Economic Performance (CEP) Discussion Paper 1413. 
This post gives the views of its authors, not the position of LSE Business Review or the London School of
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